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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WEST VALLEY CITY,
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Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 20030299-CA
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and DOES 1 THROUGH 10,
Defendant and Appellee;
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FANTASTIC SAM'S;
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
vs.
WEST VALLEY CITY,
a Utah municipal corporation,
Counterclaim Defendant.
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Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court,
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the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
James L. Christensen (#0639)
Christopher G. Jessop (#8542)
Corbridge Baird & Christensen
39 Exchange Place, #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 534-0909
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J. Richard Catten (#4291)
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE FACT THAT WEST VALLEY CITY PURCHASED THE UNDERLYING
FEE INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY HAS NO EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME
OF THIS CASE.
Despite Martin's protests to the contrary, this case is not about West Valley City

attempting to deprive Martin of compensation that he was otherwise entitled to or
expecting. The City has nothing to gain since it already has paid the previous owner for
the property. Rather, this case is about Martin attempting to exploit the simple fact that
West Valley City purchased, rather than condemned, the fee interest in the property, in
order to received a financial windfall that he would not have otherwise received.
Almost all of Martin's arguments in this case boil down to one central theme.
Martin believes that because West Valley City purchased the office building property
rather then condemning it, the rules somehow changed with respect to how he is treated
under his lease. For example, Martin argues on page 16 of his brief that the Martin Lease
presumes that both the landlord and the tenant's interest will be condemned. (Appellee's
Brief, page 16). On page 17 of his brief, he states: "Through the magic combination of
condemnation and contract law the City has devised a way to condemn property without
having to pay a penny of just compensation." (Appellee's Brief, page 17).

This

argument is entirely without foundation in either law or logic and it is not surprising that
Martin does not cite a single case in its support.
In reality, West Valley City is attempting to treat Martin exactly the same way it
would have if the City had condemned the entire building. In that case, there is no doubt
1

that Sections 19.01 and 19.05 of the Martin Lease would apply and Martin would be
prohibited from sharing in any condemnation award.

Even Martin understands this

concept because on page 14 of his brief he states: "The City's argument that Mr. Martin
is cut off from sharing in the condemnation award might have merit if the City had
condemned the entire building." (Appellee's Brief, page 14). See also Footnote 1 of
Appellee's Brief. (Appellee's Brief, page 12).
Martin's argument that the law, and the Martin Lease, somehow changed because
the City purchased the underlying fee interest is entirely made up out of thin air. His
assertion that the condemnation clause of the Martin Lease "presumes" that the entire
property would be condemned has no basis whatsoever in the terms of the Lease itself,
nor has Martin offered any evidence that the parties made such a presumption. In any
case, such parol evidence would not be admissible since the terms of the Lease are not
ambiguous. The four corners doctrine would limit Martin to showing such a presumption
within the terms of the Lease itself.

No such language exists.

Central Florida

Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, \ 12, 40 P.3d 599, 605 ("If the
language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions
are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may
be interpreted as a matter of law.")
The situation in this case is not that West Valley City has cleverly devised a way
to deprive Martin of his compensation, as suggested in his argument. It is simply that
Martin bargained that compensation away through the terms of his Lease, and is now
2

having trouble living with the terms of his bargain. Martin seems to think that West
Valley City should have paid full price for the property purchased from Heartland and
then also paid him for the value of his leasehold. That result is clearly contrary to Utah
law, since the value of the sum of various parts of a parcel of property cannot exceed the
value of the whole. State By and Through Road Commission v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294
(Utah 1975).
There is ample case law to support West Valley City's contention that, despite the
City's purchase of the fee interest, the terms of the Lease are valid and should be
enforced, and that West Valley City should be able to rely on them as would any other
party. For example, in United States v. Petty Motor Company, 327 U.S. 372, 90 L.Ed.
729, 66 S.Ct. 596 (1946), the United States Supreme Court handled a very similar
situation.
In the Petty case, the United States government originally brought a
condemnation suit against the property owner/landlord and all of the tenants, including
tenant Independent Pneumatic Tool Company (the "Tool Company"). During the course
of the litigation, the landlord and the government reached a settlement and the landlord
was dismissed from the lawsuit. Petty, at page 598. That left a situation very similar to
the situation at hand, a condemnation suit against a tenant where the condemnor and the
landlord have reached a settlement.
The Petty court then determined that the Tool Company was not entitled to
compensation for its leasehold interest because the Tool Company had contracted that
3

right away through a condemnation clause in its lease.1 The Court stated: "The lease of
the Independent Pneumatic Tool Company included a clause for its termination on the
Federal Government's entry into possession of the leased property for public use. The
events connected with the Government's entry just set out appear to meet the
requirements for termination." (Footnote omitted). Petty, at page 599.
The Supreme Court then went on to hold that: "If the Tool Company, with its
termination on condemnation clause, was the only tenant and condemnation of all
interests in the property was decreed, the landlord would take the entire compensation
because the lessee would have no rights against the fund. There would appear to be no
greater right where the landlord has been otherwise satisfied. Condemnation proceedings
are in rem, [Citations omitted] and compensation is made for the value of the rights
which are taken. [Citations omitted].
that it might otherwise have had.

The Tool Company contracted away any rights

We are dealing here with a clause for automatic

termination of the lease on a taking of property for public use by governmental authority.
With this type of clause, at least in the absence of a contrary state rule, the tenant has no

1 The condemnation clause in Petty read as follows: "If the whole or any part of the
demised premises shall be taken by Federal, State, county, city or other authority for
public use, or under any statute, or by right of eminent domain, then when possession
shall be taken thereunder of said premises, or any part thereof, the term hereby granted
and all rights of the Lessee hereunder shall immediately cease and terminate, and the
Lessee shall not be entitled to any part of any award that may be made for such taking,
nor to any damages therefor except that the rent shall be adjusted as of the date of such
termination of the Lease." Footnote 4, United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372,
375,66S.Ct, 596, 598(1946).
4

right which persists beyond the taking and can be entitled to nothing."

[Footnote

omitted]. Petty, at pages 598-599.
Another analogous case is Bradley Facilities, Inc., v. Burns, 551 A.2d 746 (Conn.
1988). In the Bradley case, a state government landlord condemned its lessee. The
lessee attempted to argue that the lease condemnation clause should not apply to
condemnation by its landlord, but rather only should apply when both the landlord and
tenant are condemned. Bradley, at page 749. This is virtually the same argument as
Martin is making. The Supreme Court of Connecticut understood the illogical nature of
this argument and found as follows:
"The position of the plaintiff is that, if a condemning authority, whether state of
federal, should choose to take only its leasehold interest, the parties intended the
condemnation clause formula not to apply. It is highly improbable, however, that such an
intention would have been entertained because it would result in the plaintiff receiving
significantly disparate amounts as compensation for the taking of the same leasehold
interest depending upon whether the fee was also taken." Bradley, at pages 749-750.
As the Bradley court correctly recognized, to throw out the condemnation clause
merely because the condemnor is also the landlord makes no logical sense. By what
logical rationale should the lessee compensation be wildly different because of who is
condemning? And by what logical rationale should the government be discriminated
against by not allowing it to rely on the plain terms of a contract?

5

These cases expose Martin's theory for what it is, a baseless attempt to create an
income where none was due or expected. Clearly the City can rely on the plain language
of the Lease by which Martin has agreed to take no compensation in the case of
condemnation. The trial court erred when it failed to enforce the terms of the Lease and
grant summary judgment to West Valley City.
II.

THE LEASEHOLD INTEREST OF MARTIN WAS TERMINATED BY
THE OPERATION OF THE SELF-EXECUTING TERMS OF SECTION
19.01 OF THE LEASE.
Martin makes the argument that the Lease has been terminated by operation of

law, rather than through the eminent domain termination provision of Section 19.01 of
the Lease.

He then argues that the lease simply vanishes and, therefore, the

condemnation provision is unenforceable.

Section 19.01 of the Lease provides for

termination of the Lease on the date that possession is taken by the condemning
authority, so one would assume that the asserted termination by law would have to occur
prior to that event. He refers to the "condemnation of the lease" as the time at which the
lease is terminated by law, but never tells us what that means. It is unclear whether he
means it terminated at the filing of the complaint or the issuance of the Order of
Immediate Occupancy. Martin cannot literally mean the "condemnation" of the Lease.
No final order of condemnation has yet been issued, and the Order of Immediate
Occupancy is an interim order, issued pendente lite. Utah State Road Com 'n v. Friberg,
687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984).
6

As support for his position, Martin quotes from the case of Redevelopment Agency
of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1989). (Appellee's Brief, page
12). However, Martin's argument fails based on the clear language of the Daskalas case
itself. The terms of the Lease in this case and the language of Daskalas are in complete
harmony.
The entire quote from the Daskalas case is as follows:
"The generally accepted rule is that if the condemning authority takes an estate in
fee simple absolute in all of the real property covered by the lease, the lease thereupon
terminates." [Citations omitted]. Thus in a total taking, any right which the lessee may
have to share in the condemnation award becomes vested at the time of the taking, absent
an agreement to the contrary. [Citations omitted]. The time of the taking is generally
considered to be the time at which the condemning authority actually takes possession of
the property, not the time at which the initial complaint is served." (Emphasis added).
Daskalas, at page 1121.
The triggering event for the suggested common law termination of the Lease is
exactly the same as the triggering event for the contractual termination of the Lease.
Clearly, the Lease was not terminated by law prior to the condemnation clause of the
Lease becoming effective. The actions happened simultaneously.

The condemnation

clause provisions of the Lease are effective, valid, and should be enforced by this Court.
This attempt by Martin to avoid application of the plain language of the Lease that he
agreed to should be denied.
7

III.

THE VALUE OF MARTIN'S LEASEHOLD INTEREST IS NOT $60,000.
On November 12, 2001, the landlord, Heartland, and West Valley City amended

the Real Estate Purchase Agreement whereby Heartland paid West Valley City $60,000
to be released from its obligation to cause Martin to vacate his Lease prior to March 1,
2002. Martin now argues that this payment constitutes a representation of the value of
his leasehold interest. That representation is not accurate and there is absolutely no
support for that contention in the record of this case.
First, it should be remembered that Martin has bargained away his right to share in
any compensation award. Therefore, the value of his leasehold really doesn't have any
bearing on the outcome of this case. However, it should be noted that the $60,000
payment from Heartland to West Valley City does not represent the value of Martin's
leasehold interest.
At the time the property was purchased, West Valley City paid additional funds to
Heartland with the idea that Heartland would use those funds to work wilh first-floor
tenants to ensure that they vacated the building no later than March 1, 2002 and to assist
them in finding space in which to relocate.

As part of that agreement, the fourth

paragraph of the Assignment of Leases specifically recognizes that the City may use
eminent domain, if necessary, to evict first-floor tenants. In such case, Heartland agreed
to be liable for all litigation costs and expenses including appraisal and attorney's fees.
(Assignment of Leases, Exhibit B to Appellee's Brief). Heartland's payment to the City,
as set forth in the Amendment to Real Estate Purchase Agreement, relieved Heartland of
8
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